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Leonardo Cianfanelli and Giacomo Como
Abstract— The asymptotic behaviour of deterministic logit
dynamics in heterogeneous routing games is analyzed. It is
proved that in directed multigraphs with parallel routes, and in
series composition of such multigraphs, the dynamics admits a
globally asymptotically stable fixed point. Moreover, the unique
fixed point of the dynamics approaches the set of Wardrop
equilibria, as the noise vanishes. The result relies on the fact that
the dynamics of aggregate flows is monotone, and its Jacobian
is strictly diagonally dominant by columns.
Index Terms— Transportation networks, Logit dynamics,
Wardrop equilibrium, Heterogeneous routing games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Congestion population games provide a powerful tool to
model real situations where users compete for resources.
An application of such games is traffic, where resources are
roads, and players using roads create negative externalities
because of congestion effects. The simplest traffic models
always assume homogeneity of players, meaning that each
player perceives the same delay over the set of the roads.
A Wardrop equilibrium is a flow distribution such that
any player cannot unilaterally decrease his perceived delay
by changing route [1]. Beckmann et al. showed that finding
a Wardrop equilibrium in the homogeneous setting is equiva-
lent to minimizing a convex potential with linear constraints
[2]. The existence of such potential has several strong impli-
cations: firstly, the game always admits at least a Wardrop
equilibrium; secondly, with the additional hypothesis that
delays are strictly increasing, the Wardrop equilibrium is
unique; moreover, the deterministic logit dynamics converges
to a perturbation of the Wardrop equilibrium, where the
magnitude of perturbations grows with noise level [3].
The homogeneity assumption simplifies the problem, but
it is very restrictive. Heterogeneity, on the one hand, allows
the description of many real situations, e.g., when payoffs
are a combination of time delays and monetary tolls and
users trade off money and time in different ways [4], [5],
or when users have different information on the state of the
roads [6], [7], [8]. On the other hand, heterogeneous games
do not admit a potential [9]. Then, existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium in such games are not trivial, as well as
convergence of deterministic logit dynamics.
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Existence and uniqueness of Wardrop equilibrium in het-
erogeneous games have been already investigated in lit-
erature. In particular, existence has been proved to hold,
even in a more general setting [10]. Conversely, unlike the
homogeneous case, uniqueness does not hold in general.
Uniqueness of aggregate flows (i.e. essential uniqueness) has
been proved to hold just on a small subset of graphs [11].
The asymptotic behaviour of some nontrivial learning
dynamics has been studied also, for instance in stochas-
tic setting, where users, playing a repeated routing game,
perceive at each stage a stochastic realization of delays on
the edges [12], [13]. To the best of our knowledge, no
papers in literature investigate the asymptotic behaviour of
deterministic logit dynamics in heterogeneous routing games,
which are not potential games. In most of the applications
the authors analyze the efficiency of the equilibria, but do
not investigate the convergence to such equilibria [6], [7],
[8]. Given these motivations, in this work we focus on
this problem, highlighting the role of the graph topology.
In particular, using monotonicity arguments, we show that
the dynamics converges to a unique globally asymptotically
stable fixed point when the graph is simple, i.e. it has parallel
routes between the origin and the destination, or is a series
composition of such simple graphs. Moreover, we show that
the unique fixed point of the dynamics approaches the set of
Wardrop equilibria, as the noise vanishes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we define the model and summarize the state of the art
on existence and uniqueness of Wardrop equilibrium. In
Section III we present the main result of the paper, which is
that the deterministic logit dynamics on simple graphs and
series composition of simple graphs converges to a unique
globally asymptotically stable fixed point. Then, in Section
IV, we present examples and numerical simulations. Finally,
in Section V, we summarize the results and discuss future
research lines.
A. Notation
Let R, R+ and Rn denote the set of real numbers,
non-negative reals, and real-valued vectors of dimension n,
respectively. Let |X | denote the cardinality of a countable
set X . ‖x‖l1 denotes the l1-norm of the vector x ∈ Rn, i.e.,
‖x‖l1 =
∑n
i=1 |xi|. Along the paper, G = (V, E) will always
denote a directed multigraph, i.e., a graph admitting parallel
edges, even where not explicitly specified. V and E denote
the node set and the edge set, respectively. Sometimes, along
the paper, we will use the word graph instead of multigraph.
However, all of the graphs in this paper are to be read as
multigraphs.
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II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Let G = (V, E) be a directed multigraph with origin o ∈ V
and destination d ∈ V . We consider several populations of
users and denote by P the set of populations. We assume
that every population has the same origin-destination pair
o-d. For each population p, let τp ≥ 0 be the throughput
which has to go from o to d, and let τ =
∑
p∈P τ
p be
the aggregate throughput. The populations differ each other
for the assignment of delay functions over the edge set. Let
dpe(x) : R+ → R+ be the delay function of population
p ∈ P on the edge e ∈ E . In population games, it is
assumed that the number of player is large, the strategy of
a single player has negligible effects on payoff functions,
and players interact anonymously. This means that delay
functions depend only on the distribution of agents strategies,
which in case of traffic are flows on the edges. Moreover, we
assume separability, i.e., each delay function depends on the
flow on the edge itself only. The delay functions are assumed
to be continuous and non-decreasing, since edges suffer from
congestion. Along the paper we will remark when additional
assumption of strictly increasing delays is needed. The set
of strategies correspond to the set of routes going from o to
d, and does not depend on populations. Let R denote the
route set, and let V , E, P and R denote the cardinalities of
V , E , P and R, respectively.
An admissible route flow distribution for a population p ∈
P is a vector zp ∈ RR+ satisfying the throughput constraint,
i.e.,
∑
r∈R z
p
r = τ
p. For a given route flow vector zp, the
(unique) edge flow vector is obtained via
fp = Azp, (1)
where A ∈ RE×R is the edge-route incidence matrix, with
entries Aer = 1, if the edge e belongs to the route r, or
0 otherwise. Let the aggregate edge flow distribution and
aggregate route flow distribution be
f =
∑
p∈P
fp, z =
∑
p∈P
zp, (2)
respectively. The cost of each route is defined as the sum of
delay of edges belonging to the route, i.e.:
cpr(z) =
∑
e∈E
Aerd
p
e(fe), (3)
where, given zp for all the populations, the aggregate edge
flow vector f is computed by (1) and (2). We remark that,
although delay functions on the edges are specific for each
population, congestion is not specific, in the sense that delay
functions depend on aggregate flows only.
Definition 1 (Heterogeneous routing game): An
heterogeneous routing game is a triple (G, P , d), where
P includes the throughput τp of each population, and d
denotes the vector containing the delay functions for each
edge and population.
In heterogeneous routing games each player aims at min-
imizing his cost (3) according to delay functions that are
specific for the population he belongs to, given the strategies
of all of the other players, i.e., flows. Indeed, since the game
is a population game, the strategy of the player itself does
not affect the flows, and consequently the costs.
Definition 2 (Wardrop equilibrium): A Wardrop equilib-
rium for the heterogeneous routing game is an admissible
route flow distribution such that for every population p ∈ P ,
and route r ∈ R
zpr > 0 ⇒ cpr(z) ≤ cpq(z) ∀q ∈ R. (4)
Thus, at Wardrop equilibrium, no one can unilaterally
decrease his cost by changing route, since every route used
by a population p has the minimal cost (measured by the
population p itself) among all the routes.
A. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
The main difference between homogeneous and heteroge-
neous games is that the latter ones do not admit a potential.
Consequently, existence and uniqueness of equilibrium are
not trivial. However, as already said, the existence of equilib-
rium in heterogeneous games still holds [10]. Before looking
into uniqueness, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 3 (Essential uniqueness of equilibrium): The
Wardrop equilibrium in an heterogeneous routing game is
said to be essentially unique if the aggregate edge flows are
the same for every Wardrop equilibria.
Milchtaich shows in [11] that the largest class of graphs
where essential uniqueness is guaranteed to hold is series of
nearly parallel graphs, in the sense that in every routing
game on such class of graphs, under the assumption of
strictly increasing delay functions, the equilibrium is essen-
tially unique. Conversely, for each graph not belonging to
such class, at least a game (G,P, d) such that the equilibrium
is not essentially unique exists.
The following example illustrates a game where equilibrium
is essentially unique, but not unique.
Example 1: Consider a multigraph G = (V, E), with V =
{o, d} and E = {e1, e2}, where both edges go from origin
o to destination d. Let P = 2 and let the delay functions be
strictly increasing. If the assignment of delay functions and
throughput admits f˜ such that
d11(f˜) = d
1
2(τ − f˜), d21(f˜) = d22(τ − f˜), (5)
all the edge flows satisfying
f11 + f
2
1 = f˜ , f
1
2 + f
2
2 = τ − f˜ ,
f11 + f
1
2 = τ
1, f21 + f
2
2 = τ
2,
(6)
are Wardrop equilibria. Thus, even though the equilibrium is
unique in terms of aggregate edge flows (essentially unique),
this game admits a continuum of equilibria in terms of
population edge flows.
As previously said, any graph not belonging to the series
of nearly parallel class admits at least a game where the
equilibrium is not essentially unique. The following exam-
ple, which is a slight modification of Example 1 in [14],
illustrates a game with two essentially different equilibria.
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b
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Fig. 1. This graph is not series of nearly parallel graphs. Then, at least a
game defined on this graph admitting multiple essentially different equilibria
exists. Example 2 provides a game with two essentially different equilibria.
Example 2: Consider the multigraph G in Fig. 1, and let
P = 3. Let us assign throughputs
τ1 = 1.2, τ2 = 1, τ3 = 1,
and the following delay functions:
d11(x) = d
1
2(x) = d
1
4(x) = d
1
6(x) = 19 + x,
d21(x) = d
2
4(x) = d
3
1(x) = d
3
4(x) = 19 + x,
d13(x) = d
1
5(x) = d
2
3(x) = 100 + x,
d26(x) = d
3
2(x) = d
3
5(x) = 100 + x,
d22(x) = d
3
6(x) = 20x,
d25(x) = d
3
3(x) = 21 + x.
Such assignment prevents population 1 from using e3 and
e5, population 2 from using e3 and e6, and population 3
from using e2 and e5. This assignment models a problem
with more classes of users who ignore the existence of some
roads. Let us denote the routes of G by r1 = (e1, e2),
r2 = (e1, e3), r3 = (e4, e5), and r4 = (e4, e6). This
game admits two essentially different equilibria. In both of
them, all the users of a population use the same route. In
equilibrium (A), populations 1, 2, and 3 use routes r1, r3,
and r4, respectively. In equilibrium (B), the used routes are
r4, r1, and r2, respectively. The aggregate edge flows at the
equilibrium (A) are
f1 = f2 = 1.2
f3 = 0
f4 = 2
f5 = f6 = 1,
(7)
while at the equilibrium (B) are
f1 = 2
f2 = f3 = 1
f4 = f6 = 1.2
f5 = 0.
(8)
We omit the proof that (A) and (B) are truly users equilibria,
because it is trivial: given the edge flows (7) and (8), it
suffices to observe that the routes used by each population
carry the minimum delay among all of the routes. Since
the aggregated flows are different, the equilibrium is not
essentially unique.
o a d
e2
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o a b
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d
Fig. 2. A simple graph and a series composition of simple graphs.
III. LOGIT DYNAMICS AND ITS STABILITY
Our main contribution in heterogeneous congestion games
is on convergence of deterministic logit dynamics on a
certain class of graphs. This dynamics is standard in the
literature of population games (see logit dynamics in [3],
or perturbed best response dynamics in [15]), and can be
derived from Kurtz’s theorem [16, Ch. 11], as the mean-
field approximation of the intrinsically stochastic noisy best
response dynamics, as the number of player grows larger.
Logit dynamics for the heterogeneous routing game reads,
for every population p ∈ P , and every route r ∈ R:
z˙pr = τ
p · exp(−η · c
p
r(
∑P
q=1 z
q))∑
s∈R exp(−η · cps(
∑p
q=1 z
q))
− zpr , (9)
where η is the inverse of noise level, and the route costs cpr
depend in general on all the components of the route flow
distribution, since each edge belongs in general to several
routes.
In this section we show that the logit dynamics on simple
graphs and series composition of simple graphs converges to
one globally asymptotically stable fixed point. Moreover, we
show that such fixed point approaches the set of the Wardrop
equilibria, as the noise vanishes. Let us start by defining those
classes of graphs.
Definition 4 (Simple multigraph): A multigraph with sin-
gle origin and destination is said to be simple if each edge
belongs to one route at most, or, alternatively, routes are
parallel.
Definition 5 (Series composition of multigraphs): Two
multigraphs G1 and G2 are said to be connected in series if
they have a single common vertex, which is the destination
in G1 and the origin in G2. The multigraph G = S(G1,G2),
where G1 and G2 are connected in series, is said to be the
series composition of G1 and G2.
Simple graphs are a subset of nearly parallel graphs. Then,
essential uniqueness on series of simple graphs is guaranteed
if the delays are strictly increasing. In Fig. 2 two examples
of those graphs are provided.
The main result of the paper will be now shown.
Theorem 1 (Convergence on series of simple graphs):
Let G = (V, E) be a simple directed multigraph, or a series
composition of simple directed multigraphs. Let P be the set
of populations, and d be the vector of non-decreasing delay
functions for every edge and population. The continuous
logit dynamics (9) for the game (G,P, d) converges to a
unique globally asymptotically stable fixed point. Let f˜pe (η)
denote such unique fixed point, as function of noise level.
As the noise vanishes, limn→+∞ f˜pe (η) approaches the set
of Wardrop equilibria.
Remark 1: Theorem 1 states the uniqueness of the fixed
point under the assumption of non-decreasing delay func-
tions, although on series of simple graphs such assumption
does not guarantee either the uniqueness or the essential
uniqueness of the equilibrium. In fact, it can be shown that,
if the equilibrium is not unique, the dynamics selects the
equilibrium where every population randomizes uniformly
among its optimal routes. An example will be provided in
the next section.
We are going to prove Theorem 1 through the following
intermediate results. First, we establish Lemma 1 on l1-
contraction in monotone dynamical systems. Next, we show
in Proposition 1 that the logit dynamics on simple graphs
converges to a unique globally stable fixed point. Finally,
we will show that, if the dynamics converges in two graphs,
the convergence holds for the series composition of them,
also.
Let us start with the plan.
Lemma 1 (l1 contraction): Let z ∈ Rn and z˙ = f(z) be
an autonomous dynamical system. Let J be the Jacobian
matrix of f . Let J satisfy the following properties:
1) J is Metzler (i.e ∂fi∂zj ≥ 0, ∀i 6= j);
2) J is diagonally dominant, and in particular
∑
i
∂fi
∂zj
=
−a, ∀j, with a ≥ 0.
Then ‖z˜(t)− z(t)‖l1 ≤ ‖z˜(0)− z(0)‖l1e−at, where z˜ and z
are solutions of z˙ = f(z).
Proof: The proof follows the steps of Lemma 5 in [17].
See also [18]. For details see Appendix A.
Instead of studying the dynamics over all the possible
simple graphs, we are going to investigate just the case of
simple graphs composed of 2 nodes and E parallel edges,
going from the origin to the destination. In such graphs, edge
flows and route flows are equivalent, and the cost of each
route only depends on the flow on the route itself.
Remark 2: Investigating this case only, instead of all the
simple multigraphs, does not determine any loss of gener-
ality. Indeed, all of the removed nodes do not impose any
decision to the players. Hence, they can be removed with the
prescription that the cost of each route, which is by (3) the
sum of delays of all the edges along the route, is assigned
to a single edge.
Thus, logit dynamics on simple graphs reads:
f˙pe = τ
p · exp(−η · d
p
e(
∑P
q=1 f
q
e ))∑E
j=1 exp(−η · dpj (
∑P
q=1 f
q
j ))
− fpe . (10)
This system is composed of E × P coupled equations
describing the evolution in time of flows. The main difference
between the simple and the general case is that in the simple
case the evolution of each edge is affected by the other edge
flows only through the normalization, because routes are
parallel. This is the key point to prove the next proposition.
Proposition 1 (Convergence on simple graphs): Let G =
(V, E) be a simple directed multigraph. Let P be the set of
populations, and d be the vector of non-decreasing delay
functions for every edge and population. The continuous
logit dynamics (9) for the game (G,P, d) converges to a
unique globally asymptotically stable fixed point. Moreover,
as the noise vanishes, limη→+∞ f˜pe (η) approaches the set of
Wardrop equilibria. Furthermore, the aggregate flow distri-
bution f =
∑P
p=1 f
p converges exponentially in time.
The proof relies on that the dynamics of the aggregated flows
satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 1. The assumption of
simple graph is crucial, since it guarantees that the Jacobian
J is Metzler. For the details, see Appendix B.
The next proposition states that, if the dynamics converges
on two graphs, it converges on series composition of them
also.
Proposition 2 (Convergence in series of graphs): Let G1
and G2 be two directed multigraphs, and let G = S(G1,G2)
be their series composition. If the logit dynamics on G1
and G2 converges to a globally asymptotically stable fixed
point, the logit dynamics on G converges to a globally
asymptotically stable fixed point as well. Morevoer, as the
noise vanishes, if both the fixed point of logit dynamics on
G1 and logit dynamics on G2 approach their respective sets
of Wardrop equilibria, the fixed point of logit dynamics on
G approaches the set of Wardrop equilibria on G as well.
For the proof, see Appendix C. We can now conclude the
proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: [of Theorem 1] By Proposition 1, the logit
dynamics on simple graphs converges to a unique globally
asymptotically stable fixed point. Then, by applying Propo-
sition 2 recursively, logit dynamics on series compositions
of an arbitrary number of simple graphs converges to a
unique globally asymptotically stable fixed point. Moreover,
by Propositions 1, as the noise vanishes, the fixed point of
dynamics approaches the set of the Wardrop equilibria. Then,
by Proposition 2, the same holds for series compositions of
simple graphs.
IV. EXAMPLES AND NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section three examples are shown. The first example
shows that, on simple graphs, even if the equilibrium is not
unique, the logit dynamics selects the equilibrium where each
population randomizes uniformly among his optimal routes.
The second example illustrates the role played by the noise.
Finally, the last example shows that when the equilibrium
is not essentially unique, and the noise is sufficiently small,
the dynamics selects one equilibrium based on the initial
conditions.
Example 1 (Continued): Consider a multigraph G, with 2
nodes and 2 parallel edges from origin to destination, and
the following assignment:
d11(f1) = f1 + 1, d
2
1(f1) = 2f1, τ
1 = 1;
d12(f2) = 2f2, d
2
2(f2) = f2 + 1; τ
2 = 1.
It is easy to check that this assignment satisfies conditions
(5) and (6). Then, the game admits a continuum of Wardrop
equilibria. In particular, any edge flow distribution satisfying
f11 = f
1
1 , f
1
2 = 1− f11 , f21 = 1− f11 , f22 = f11 ,
is a Wardrop equibrium. Nevertheless, numerical simulations
in Fig. 3 show that the dynamics selects the equilibrium
where both the populations split their throughput among both
routes, as claimed in Remark 1.
Example 3: Consider the simple multigraph in Fig. 2. Let
d11(f1) = f1 + 1, d
2
1(f1) = (f1)
2 + 1;
d12(f2) =
f2
2
+ 2, d22(f2) = f2 + 2;
d13(f3) = (f3)
2 + 1, d23(f3) = f3 + 2;
d14(f4) =
f4
2
, d24(f4) = f4;
τ1 = 5, τ2 = 5.
In Fig. 4, numerical simulations of logit dynamics, as the
noise decreases, are shown. When η = 0, the dynamics
randomizes among all the routes, since the noise diverges.
As η grows larger, the trajectories converge closer to the
Wardrop equilibrium. We also show that, starting with two
different initial conditions, the aggregate flows converge each
other at least exponentially, as stated in Proposition 1.
Example 2 (Continued): Consider again the multigraph G
in Fig. 1. In the first part of the example a game with two
essentially different equilibria has been provided. Let us now
focus on the logit dynamics for. Of course, when η = 0,
at the equilibrium, every population randomizes among all
the routes. However, Fig. 5 shows that, if η is sufficiently
large, the trajectories converge close to one of the equilibria,
depending on initial conditions. Thus, the logit dynamics on
this graph has a bifurcation point: if the noise is sufficiently
large, the dynamics admits a globally asymptotically stable
fixed point, while, as the noise decreases, the dynamics
admits two asymptotically stable fixed points.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this work the asymptotic behaviour of deterministic
logit dynamics in heterogeneous routing games is analyzed,
where by heterogeneous we mean that several populations
of users, which differ for delay functions, are admitted. We
prove that on simple graphs, and series composition of simple
graphs, the dynamics converges to a globally asymptotically
stable fixed point. The proof follows from monotonicity
properties of the dynamics.
We are aware that series composition of simple graphs
is not the largest class of graphs where uniqueness of
Fig. 3. A logit dynamics trajectory for Example 1, with η = 5. Different
curves correspond to different elements fpe .
Fig. 4. Trajectories of logit dynamics for Example 3 Top left: η = 0.
Top right: η = 0.2. Bottom left: η = 2. Bottom right: Let g and h be two
trajectories for the evolution of the aggregate flows with different initial
conditions, and let η = 2; the blue curve is ‖g(t)− h(t)‖l1 , while the red
one is ‖g(0) − h(0)‖l1e−t; as proved in Proposition 1, the blue one is
below the red one.
Fig. 5. Trajectories of logit dynamics on the graph in Fig. 1, with
η = 10. The two graphs show two trajectories starting from different
initial conditions. Different colors correspond to different components of the
aggregate edge flows. We observe that the asymptotic behaviour of dynamics
depends on initial condition.
equilibrium holds. Milchtaich proved in [11] that the largest
class where essential uniqueness holds, regardless of the
assignment of delay functions, is series of nearly parallel
graphs. Investigating the behaviour of the dynamics on nearly
parallel graphs other than simple is one of the future research
lines. However, the arguments used along this paper cannot
be applied for graphs where routes are not parallel.
Furthermore, Example 1 suggests that, if the equilibrium is
not essentially unique and the noise is sufficiently small, the
dynamics converges to one among the equilibria. Since the
graphs where essential uniqueness holds are a negligible frac-
tion of real graphs, a further interesting question is whether
the dynamics always converge to one among the equilibria
in case of multiple essentially different equilibria. Finally, in
order to extend these results to more realistic applications,
another future research line will be the characterization of
the dynamics in case of multiple origin-destination pairs.
Unfortunately, even for simple graphs, the dynamics is not
monotone. Thus, different techniques should be used.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
By definition of the l1-norm and the linearity of the
derivative, we get
d
dt
‖z˜ − z‖l1 =
d
dt
∑
i
|z˜i − zi| =
∑
i
d
dt
|z˜i − zi|
=
∑
i
sign(z˜i − zi)( ˙˜zi − z˙i)
=
∑
i
sign(z˜i − zi)(fi(z˜)− fi(z))
=
∑
i
sign(z˜i − zi)(fi(z + h)− fi(z)),
(11)
where z˜ = z + h. From
fi(z + h)− fi(z) =
∫ 1
0
dfi(z + τh)
dτ
dτ
=
∫ 1
0
∇fi(z + τh) · hdτ
=
∫ 1
0
∑
j
∂fi
∂zj
hjdτ,
eq. (11) is equal to∫ 1
0
∑
i
sign(hi)
∑
j
∂fi
∂zj
hjdτ.
Because sign(hi) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, it follows∑
i
sign(hi)
∑
j
∂fi
∂zj
hj =
+
∑
i∈I+
(
∑
j∈I+
∂fi
∂zj
hj +
∑
j∈I−
∂fi
∂zj
hj)
−
∑
i∈I−
(
∑
j∈I+
∂fi
∂zj
hj +
∑
j∈I−
∂fi
∂zj
hj).
(12)
If we consider just the first part of the second term of the
last equation we get
+
∑
i∈I+
∑
j∈I+
∂fi
∂zj
hj +
∑
i∈I+
∑
j∈I−
∂fi
∂zj
hj ,
where
+
∑
i∈I+
∑
j∈I+
∂fi
∂zj
hj = +
∑
j∈I+
hj
∑
i∈I+
∂fi
∂zj
≤ −a
∑
j∈I+
|hj | ≤ 0
because for each j ∈ I− the sum
∑
i∈I+
∂fi
∂zj
contains for
sure the element on the diagonal, but may not contain all
the elements of the jth column out of the diagonal.
At the same time
+
∑
i∈I+
∑
j∈I−
∂fi
∂zj
hj ≤ 0,
because hj = −|hj | for each j ∈ I− and each term ∂fi∂zj
do not belong to the diagonal and it is non-negative by
hypothesis.
Similarly we can operate on the second part of (12) and we
obtain
d
dt
‖z˜ − z‖l1 =
∫ 1
0
∑
i
sign(hi)
∑
j
∂fi
∂zj
hjdτ
≤ −a
∫ 1
0
(
∑
j∈I+
|hj |+
∑
j∈I−
|hj |)dτ
= −a‖z˜ − z‖l1
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Let us consider the evolution of aggregate flows fe =∑P
p=1 f
p
e :
f˙e =
P∑
p=1
[τp · exp(−η · d
p
e(fe))∑E
j=1 exp(−η · dpj (fj))
]− fe. (13)
The system above has some interesting properties. Firstly,
it is autonomous in the aggregate flows. Secondly, it is
monotone, i.e. the non-diagonal elements of the Jacobian are
non-negative: indeed, ∀i 6= j, f˙i depend on fj only by the
normalization. Moreover
E∑
e=1
f˙e = τ −
E∑
e=1
fe. (14)
From (14) it follows that the Jacobian is strictly diagonally
dominant by columns, in particular
∑E
i=1 Jij = −1 ∀j.
Then, (13) satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 1 with a = 1,
and we can conclude that it admits one globally exponentially
stable fixed point.
It still remains to prove that, since aggregate flows converge,
also the edge flows of every population converge to a unique
globally asymptotically stable fixed point. To this end, let us
write (10) as:
f˙pe = F
p
e (f)− fpe , (15)
where f ∈ RE+ is the aggregate edge flow distribution, which
evolves according to (13), independently of population flows
fp, and
F pe (f) = τ
p · exp(−η · d
p
e(fe))∑E
j=1 exp(−η · dpj (fj))
. (16)
We now show that, since every aggregated edge flow fe
converges, every population edge flow fpe converges as
well. Observe that F pe (f) is continuous for every edge and
population. Let f˜ = limt→+∞ f(t) denote the fixed point
of aggregate flow distribution. By continuity of F pe (f), and
convergence of (13), we get that ∀ > 0, ∃T > 0 such that
|F pe (f(t))− F pe (f˜)| <  ∀t > T,∀e ∈ E ,∀p ∈ P. (17)
It follows:
F pe (f˜)−−fpe < F pe (f(t))−fpe < F pe (f˜)+−fpe ∀t > T.
(18)
Since evolution of flows does not depend explicitly on
time, we can, without loss of generality, translate the axis
of time by −T , so that (18) holds ∀t > 0. Moreover, by
continuity of delay functions, in t = 0,
F pe (f˜)− − fpe ≤ F pe (f(0))− fpe ≤ F pe (f˜) + − fpe . (19)
It is easy to prove that:
fpe (t) ≥ (fpe (0)− F pe (f˜) + )e−t + F pe (f˜)− ;
fpe (t) ≤ (fpe (0)− F pe (f˜)− )e−t + F pe (f˜) + ,
(20)
where the right terms in (20) are solutions of
f˙pe (t) = F
p
e (f˜)− − fpe ;
f˙pe (t) = F
p
e (f˜) + − fpe ,
(21)
respectively, with initial condition fpe (0). Indeed, let us
assume that the first inequality in (20) does not hold, i.e.,
it exists a time t2 > 0 such that
fpe (t2) < (f
p
e (0)− F pe (f˜) + )e−t2 + F pe (f˜)− . (22)
Then, it must exist a time t1 such that 0 ≤ t1 < t2,
fpe (t1) = (f
p
e (0)− F pe (f˜) + )e−t1 + F pe (f˜)− , (23)
and
f˙pe (t1) = F
p
e (f(t1))− fpe (t1) < F pe (f˜)− − fpe (t1), (24)
which is impossible by (19). A similar argument can be used
to prove the second inequality in (20). Then, from (20), it
follows:
F pe (f˜) +  ≥ lim
t→+∞ f
p
e (t) ≥ F pe (f˜)− , (25)
and since we can choose  arbitrarily small,
lim
t→+∞ f
p
e (t) = F
p
e (f˜) ∀e ∈ E ,∀p ∈ P. (26)
Hence, fpe (t) converges to a unique fixed point for each
initial condition.
Let f˜pe (η) denote the unique fixed point as function of
noise level. Let ηn be an infinite sequence, such that
limη→+∞ ηn = +∞. Since f˜pe (ηn) is compact, ηn admits
a subsequence ηnk such that f˜
p
e (ηnk) converges. Let (f˜
p
e )
∗
denote such limit.
From (16), it follows:
lim
η→+∞F
p
e (η, f˜
∗) =
{
τp
|Epopt(f˜∗)|
, if e ∈ Epopt(f˜∗),
0, otherwise,
(27)
where Epopt(f˜∗) denotes the set of edges that have minimal
cost, given f˜∗, for population p, and we recall that the
equivalence between routes and edges holds by assumption
of simple graph and Remark 2. Then, since (9) admits a
unique fixed point, from (15), we get:
(f˜pe )
∗ = lim
η→+∞F
p
e (η, f˜
∗). (28)
Equations (27) and (28) imply that, for every edge e ∈ E ,
and every population p ∈ P:
(f˜pe )
∗ > 0 ⇒ dpe(f˜∗) ≤ dpl (f˜∗), ∀l ∈ E , (29)
that is equivalent to the definition of the Wardrop equilibrium
(4) in simple graphs with 2 nodes and E parallel edges.
Moreover, we also observe that, even if the game admits
multiple equilibria (with same aggregated flows, since the
graph is simple) (f˜pe )
∗ represents a specific equilibrium.
Indeed, from (27) and (28), we observe that in (f˜pe )
∗ each
population randomizes uniformly among its optimal routes.
Then, every subsequence f˜pe (ηnk) converges to the Wardrop
equilibrium where each population randomizes uniformly
among its optimal routes. Consequently, the same holds for
f˜pe (ηn) and f˜
p
e (η).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Every route in G is composed of a route in G1 concatenated
with a route in G2. Given this motivation, let us denote every
route of G by a double index, where the first one refers to
routes in G1, and the second one to routes in G2. Then, (9)
reads:
z˙pij = τ
p · exp(−η · c
p
ij(
∑P
q=1 z
q))∑
l∈R1
m∈R2
exp(−η · cplm(
∑p
q=1 z
q))
− zpij . (30)
Since cost functions are additive, we have cij(z) = ci(z) +
cj(z). Then:
z˙pij = τ
p· exp(−η · c
p
i (
∑P
q=1 z
q))∑
l∈R1 exp(−η · c
p
l (
∑p
q=1 z
q))
· exp(−η · c
p
j (
∑P
q=1 z
q))∑
m∈R2 exp(−η · c
p
m(
∑p
q=1 z
q))
− zpij .
(31)
Obviously, we have
zpi =
∑
j∈R2
zpij ∀i ∈ R1,
zpj =
∑
i∈R1
zpij ∀j ∈ R2.
(32)
Then, by summing over the index j (or i) in (31), we get
the following dynamics for zi (or zj):
z˙pi = τ
p · exp(−η · c
p
i (
∑P
q=1 z
q))∑
l∈R1 exp(−η · c
p
l (
∑p
q=1 z
q))
− zpi . (33)
We observe that (33) is equivalent to (9), meaning that
dynamics on G1 (and G2) induced by logit dynamics on G is
equivalent to logit dynamics on G1 (and G2) separately. Let
us assume that logit dynamics on both G1 and G2 converges
to a globally asymptotically stable fixed point. Following the
steps of the proof of Proposition 1, (31) can be written as
z˙pij = F
p
ij(zG1 , zG2)− zpij , (34)
where zG1 and zG2 denote the route flow distributions on
G1 and G2, respectively. Since zGi and zGj converge for
every initial condition by assumption, the convergence of
(34) easily follows.
Moreover, since the route choice on G is decoupled in
two independent route choices on G1 and G2, the Wardrop
equilibria on G are the compositions of the equilibria on
G1 and G2. Thus, since logit dynamics on G, and logit
dynamics on G1 and G2 separately, converge to same route
flow distributions zG1 and zG2 , and since the fixed point
of logit dynamics on G1 and G2 approach the set of the
equilibria as the noise vanishes, we conclude that the fixed
point of logit dynamics on G approaches the set of Wardrop
equilibria, as the noise vanishes.
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